mandag 30. mai 2016

No. 1229: Now it's the public prosecutor in Oslo that finally after 4 months. after mailing, received the petition for appeal, which will be forwarded Borgating Court of Appeal!

No. 1229:
Now it's the public prosecutor in Oslo that finally after 4 months. after mailing, received the petition for appeal, which will be forwarded Borgating Court of Appeal!

Now it is after all a happy day that Oslo police after 4 months. procrastination has sent an appeal by a lawyer Brynjar Meling on to the public prosecutor who will then forward it all to Borgating Court of Appeal!

The case is really settled when all revelations that have come in recent months. tells everyone that Jan Aage Torp has lied to the police, and for everyone else as it was my preaching that he hated so fervently !!!!!!!!

When concerning remarriage which the word of God clearly states is a sin and adultery. It was not least what was written on the Heavenly blog and Heavenly blog as did his with the high Google rankings I have!

Pray that the prosecutor keeps calm and let justice happen that Torp are accused of false accusations, and Norway's two largest grid roll charged with flaming today welcomed me and my family. This applies Ansgar Braut who writes constantly under fake profiles (he has about 20 to 20 names to at least online), and Torodd Fuglesteg. And that Searchlight by Sverre Andersen also being charged with complicity when it is he who has brought all this nettrolene write on his website!

Image of lawyer Brynjar Meling left and the criminal fool apostle Jan Aage Torp right!

Here's lawyer Brynjar Meling its appeal by writing:
The Court of Appeal

SUPPORT FACE-TO APPEAL OVER OSLO THINGS BROUGHT DOM¬ In ITEM NO ¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬-15-073540MED-OTIR/02¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬ Jan Kåre Christensen¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬ against The Public Prosecution.
* *
Referring to the Oslo district court's judgment in case number 15-073540MED-OTIR / 02 dated 01/25/16 with so's judgment:
1. Jan Kåre Christensen, b. 08/03/1964 sentenced for violation of the Criminal Code of 1902 §3-90 a to a bid of 12,000 - twelve thousand - million going to sit in jail for 20 - twenty - days.
2. Jan Kåre Christensen acquitted of restitution claim.
3. Jan Kåre Christensen judged on to pay costs to the public by 3000 - three thousand - respectively.
The verdict is proclaimed by promoted preaching in Oslo District Court on Friday 29.01.16 at. 09:30. The verdict was appealed by the ministry. Support Written notification by appeal deadline. The appeal is therefore timely.

Anke object.
The appeal application of the law and evidence application the question of guilt.

The factual side
The facts are on the whole not disputed, however, that Christensen points out that he has not repeated the concepts to such an extent as indicated by the aggrieved party. It appears in his testimony before the district court that it is rebuttal from aggrieved to Torp and people who speak Torp case that things have been repeated and generated.
It is not disputed that Christensen comes with the statements reproduced in the indictment. The contested nor that this has been going on over time. The details of the period and scope has no bearing on the legal. The court has indiscriminately added Torp's explanation on this point basis and have focused on this in his guilt assessment. The correct according to Christensen is that he has referred the matters in significantly fewer times and in all material so this has come as a response to articles that affects Christensen.

Generally these statements
It noted that the terms used is normative and based on Christensen's perception rendered. It should be noted that the terms live in words, "immoral" and "prostitute" are terms used in Bible translations, as it was presented to the district court with specific Bible references.
It points out that the term "leper" is also a Biblical expression that denotes it to be unclean and thus be excluded from society.

The reason for the conflict
It also pointed out that an item that background that Christensen "went to 'attack' 'on Torp, is a relationship that Torp in court acknowledged, where a young person, as Christensen perceive as" easy prey "should have given Torp everything he owned and had in terms of selling their house and at this render a donation consisting of almost 1.5 million. This was funds that Torp received and spent in their Christian, evangelical activities.
Christensen is clear that he can not find Torp living in accordance with its interpretation of the Bible. He believes that when Torp live by a form of double standards, where the life and teachings mismatched.

Deficiencies in the District Court's judgment
It may on occasion preceding paragraph mentioned that a defect in the Court's judgment is that the court does not have sufficiently emphasized that Torp is a public person, and must therefore have a higher tolerance limit for what he will accept the attack on his activity .
Moreover, neither the court paid sufficient attention that Torp acknowledged in court that he has called Christensen for "Anders Behring Breivik sympathizer" on a few occasions and has called him demon, light guide, rumor spreader, etc. Based on the principle of provocation retorsjon this in itself circumstances that would warrant an acquittal. Victim's contribution to the debate has in no way helped to reduce the level of conflict in the debate, so that the matter is the statements that contribute to raise what Torp must withstand the attack.

Of law appeal.
It is noted, however, that the central argument - and that principle by appeal - relates to the application of the 1902 Penal Code § 390 a. It is argued that to apply them at the blog, regardless how extensive a blog business is - in effect that the provision be subject for an expansive interpretation.
It is established law that the freedom of speech area rather must interpret a penal provision restrictively, if this provision conflicts with the Covenant obligations. In this case, the criminal code. § 390 a conflict with freedom of expression. In addition to being protected by the Constitution, further determine the Constitution. § 100, as is the Convention attached to the ECHR Art. 10 and SP art 18 and 19.
The court takes its decision a correct starting point by stating that the provision aimed at those who "by frightening or distressing behavior or other reckless behavior that infringes on another's peace."
The court uses the legislative history wrong. Proposition 41 (1954-55) pp. 20-55 is itself a legal argument in favor of acquittal with a conviction. Referring to the allegations mentioned above, together with the legislative history says "the decision must be made concrete and circumstances of time, place and the victim's individual circumstances will affect the assessment". Moreover, it appears in the legislative history that "under the term 'nuisance behavior' go such vexatious phone calls.
It is a key element in both the legislative history that the relevant case law, it is pointed out activities aimed directly against a person; meaning that one call, send messages, or seek out people or its local area. This has not Jan Kåre Christensen made.
As shown by the Rt. 2014 p. 669 paragraphs 17-18, the "mind integrity" as protected by the provision and "only serious violations affected." The court discusses on page 5-6 defender's allegations that blog is not affected because it is not aimed directly at Torp. The court will still p. 6 that the posts are published on the Internet and concludes that this does not preclude the application of § 390 a. This is a formulation that would in itself may question whether or not involves a expansive interpretation of the wording of strl. § 390 a) and thus already at this point. Infringes clarity principle ECHR 7 and legality in grl. § 96.
Difficult it becomes when the court finds support for its view in the case law. Neither the Oslo District Court decision in 2013-111-859, RG 208-1499 or THEDM 2004-3964 may be cited for applying the criminal code. § 390 a on the blog. It's in both of these decisions, talk about actions that have just aimed more directly at people.
When the court additionally highlights that blog posts are open available for everyone and indexed so that they get hits on Torps one on search engines like Google, it shows precisely that one is outside the private sphere. It is not so that one can understand and interpret it as when "affected" can be regarded to have received the message when it came to his knowledge - since the accused's activity has such a scope and intensity that Torp and Christensen's case.
Here are making the right not only an expansive interpretation of the penal provision but they are "enough" is also the fact, which can be an equally strict violation of the principle of legality. The court uses RG 2008 p. 1499 as the basis for its position without any discussion or in any way argue why this is relevant. From here noted that in RG 2008 p. 1499 had convicted hung hundred posters in the victim's community, where the victim was named and given information that he was convicted. The fact of the matter is therefore - unlike the present case - that the defendant has sought aggrieved community and hung him out in public bulletin. This is nothing but adding this openly in a blog.
Here it may be noted that the court has disregarded in the fact that Torp's own activities have helped to disseminate information. It may on that occasion declared that the first mentioned Oslo district court's judgment against Christensen was Torp in his blog. It shows that there is no privacy Torp is committed to protecting by reporting Christensen but he does this as part of their "struggle". It is argued here that the judiciary should be careful not to let himself be used. That is why isolation right when the police have dismissed Christensen reviews from Torp, but it is thus wrong to maintain other way.
The court also brings into matters related to Torp's spouse. As pointed out by the defender in court would possibly Torp spouse privacy had a greater right to protection than Torp itself. Torp's spouse is not a public person, it is Torp. This is, however, beyond the fine.
Relationship to free speech protection in the Constitution. § 100 and ECHR. 10, SP art 18 and 19 are not properly considered by the Oslo District Court. The court refers to LB - 2015-24004 which states that "it is certainly clear that utterances in isolation are not punishable, may under the Penal Code 390 a. The condition is that they occur in a number and at times makes it particularly distressing for the recipient ".
This shows once again that basically incorrect. When Borgarting Court of Appeal in the case points out the number and times that make it "particularly troublesome" shows once again that the basic premise is that the inquiries must abide directly against a person. Reference to Rt. 2010, p. 845 in the relevant Court of Appeal judgment shows that it concerns direct contact. In Rt. 2010, p. 845, we are facing a case where the chairman of the Immigration Tribunal received repeated SMS messages with insulting and threatening content.

Further details on the legal

It follows from the criminal code. § 1, 2.ledd, that the criminal law applies to any restrictions imposed by agreements with foreign states or of international law in general. Christensen has therefore protection as well ECHR 10 SP art 18 and 19.
His statements are also protected by the Constitution § 100. It follows already of Gujrat Judgment Rt. 1976 p.1. that the constitutional provisions governing the individual's personal liberty must have impact that is significant.
It is argued that the District Court's interpretation of the statements, means that the judgment result is contrary to the principle of legality, clarity principle and judgment result violates Jan Kåre Christensen of religion and freedom of expression.
The Court has in several decisions highlighted that freedom of expression is one of the absolutely fundamental elements of the basis for a democratic society. It is emphasized that this freedom not only includes the right to submit statements that are favorably received or regarded harmless, or minor, but also statements that are offensive, shocking or disturbs.
In Oslo District Court decision is not the stringent requirements of the grounds for restriction of freedom of expression met. Although there is only one remedy matters, there is no proportionality between the procedure and the purpose of this.
After EMD practice must exceptions speech subjected to a restrictive interpretation, see. That it must be "necessary". A central element of necessity assessment is whether there is an urgent social need for the procedure - "pressing social need". Referring to the so-called "Spycatcher" judge, Serie A # 216, judgment paragraph 60, and 217, the judgment section 50.
In Christensen's case must be weighed against all of the adjudicated claims are his views on theological issues, or provocations made against either him or his faith.
When the Supreme Court majority in Kjuus Judgment Rt. 1997 s 1821 finds that the statements are not protected by freedom of expression, this ia based on the following:
"I can not see that the right to form a political party can be inferred that groups that do this, and dons their positions form of a manifesto, should be free to agitate for any vision, whatever interventions it had to involve over others people."
For Christensen - as sites of their right to make statements, protected as well religious freedom as freedom of expression, this is different. He advocates a view that - though it is rare now - has stood for centuries, and that is not expressed that "he dons his stances form of a religion".
It is also argued that the statements came as part of a public debate. A debate that whoever statements frames also participated in, and reciprocated. Such a debate is protected by freedom of speech under the Constitution L-100 which weighs very heavily. Allowing the utterances of a party and deprive the victim of his remarks, the right to speak out will in itself be contrary to freedom of expression
Should criminal code § 390 a used in this case, it will only be done by an expanding interpretation of the law - which is impossible, cf. Legality of the Constitution § 96.
It is clearly evident in jurisprudence that interpretation must not only be based on how the general belongs will perceive the statements, see. Plenary ruling in Rt-1997-1821 (Kjuus). but one
"Must also see the statements in light of the context in which they have emerged."
It appears here that the statements are normative, emerged in a blog debate between people who share faith, and with references to external's perception of a common creed.
On the interpretation of the statements says Eggen Norwegian Law Review 1998 p 263:
"For utters becomes jurisprudence as little predictability whether one" relaxes "the criminal liability conditions or interpreting utterances freely so that they are aligned with these terms. One of the main objectives behind legality in Norwegian law, and in allfall law requirement ECHR is to ensure predictability in the application of law.
He continues later on the same page:
"When legality sets limits on how far the contextual interpretation of the Criminal Code it is acceptable to go, it would be inconsistent if the courts were to stand freely in contextual interpretation of utterances"
The consideration of both legality and freedom of expression implies that there are clear limits to how far one can go in if interpretation meaning and circumstances of the statements that are not directly stated or acknowledged.
Straight Safety, particularly ensuring predictability, is accented in Rt. 2002, p. 1618. consideration to freedom of expression implies
"That no one should be able to risking criminal liability by the statement attributed to a meaning that is not expressly stated nor with reasonable certainty can be inferred from the context"
Reference is also made to Eggen, Law and 1998 s 264 which gives rise to another consideration:
"A free interpretation involves besides less predictability of law also greater opportunity for censorship from the Court file of speech they dislike, perhaps for reasons other than those behind the penal provision"
Interpreted as religious expressions and interpretations of the Bible's view of remarriage, can not utterances judged. When court excludes the interpretation option, then "pushes" one statement outside the core area of ​​the Constitution § 100 of free speech.
Rt 2002, p. 1618 Boot Boys judgment is thus relevant. "Boot Boys" was a neo-Nazi fighting organization, as a Saturday morning on the square in Askim performed an appeal with support for Hitler on the occasion of Rudolf Hess's 100th day.
"Every day rob, rape and kill immigrants Norwegians, every day our people and country are being plundered and destroyed by Jews, who suck our country empty of wealth and replace it with immoral and un-Norwegian thoughts." The appeal ended with "Sieg full- and Hitler greetings. "
Boot Boys' leader Terje Sjølie was acquitted. The statements were found to be derived from a political program rather than being specific threats. Several of those in attendance were dressed in finland hoods, and the demonstration was a militaristic combat fascist nature. The statements fell in front of immigrants who made their errands in Askim. Christensen's statements come in response to the actions that he believes is in dtrid with God's word. Statements fall in Blog where most statements are in response to charges from persons Christensen perceive as mouthpiece for Torp. . Sjølis statements fell unprovoked against innocent people.

clarity requirement
Whether expanding the wording of the law, or the meaning of that statement, you come in conflict with the clarity requirement and legality. The Supreme Court has the 02.08.2012 handed down a ruling in which clarity principle being discussed:
Clarity The requirement has been expressed in several decisions of the Supreme Court, including the decision in Rt-2011-469, in which the question was whether the provision in the Penal Code § 219 also applied in relation to former cohabitants, although the legal text only referred to former spouses. Section 9 states:
'Such an extension of the criminal liability, compared with what follows from the wording of § 219, must be authorized by law.
I refer to the Constitution § 96 and ECHR Article 7, ref. Rt-2009-780 Section 21. Penalties Dignity, or other real reasons that may justify to juxtapose previously cohabiting with former spouses, is not sufficient. '
Then comes something that is central to the Christensen case that are not sufficiently emphasized by the court
The Court of Appeal for its part, notes that the requirement for clear statutory basis for criminal liability not least will be significant in cases where penal provision implies a restriction of freedom of speech
Under section 18 comes the Supreme Court with his views.
As the Court of Appeal points out, have basically the assessment be a requirement for clear legal applicable in criminal cases, cf. The Constitution § 96 and ECHR Article 7. It appears to Rt-2011-469, section 9, quoted in the Court of Appeal ruling.
This is elaborated in Rt-2012-313 paragraph 29, which states:
"It is nevertheless not decisive what the legislature might have intended, when any legislator's intention has not been clearly expressed in the law. I refer to the law's requirement of the Constitution § 96 and ECHR Article 7, so this is understood partly in Rt-2011-469. Of particular interest are paragraphs 9 and 12 of the judgment, in which it emphasized that the criminality of need resulting from the law, and that a lack of support in the wording is not cured by that relationship is clearly worthy of punishment, and that the legislator undoubtedly wanted to frame it. "

Secondarily - restrictive interpretation of the provisions
It submits alternatively, that if the appellate court finds that the statements violate privacy, for a common interpretation of the legal provisions of the criminal code. § 390 A, and that the district court did not have extended interpretation of the statements in a way that is contrary to the ECHR 7 and Constitution. § 96, as follows from the criminal code. § 1, paragraph 2, that the interests of Christensen's rights - and our commitments - under ECHR and SP on the safeguarding of the individual's freedom of religion and freedom of expression, imply that the criminal code. § 390 a) in cases where religion and freedom of speech are violated, must be interpreted narrowly.

Emphasis for this down so
P to s t a n d:
Jan Kåre Christensen acquitted

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