mandag 25. februar 2019

No. 1481: The newspaper VG is still dividing on Ivar Underberge - but it is not his "fault" that the legislation has not been updated after days of internet use!

No. 1481:
The newspaper VG is still dividing on Ivar Underberge - but it is not his "fault" that the legislation has not been updated after days of internet use!

Picture of the "bully victim" to the newspaper VG, Ivar Underberge.

The newspaper VG delivers and hammers loose on Ivar Underberge as if they own no shame or wit!

It is then not his "fault" that the law is not updated after days of internet use!
We know what it is like in school. Where the bravest boy bully the weakest students, who can never take back. At that level, the newspaper VG, if not a little further down, is. Here there is a person who can never fight back against VG, but who is in article by article hanged out. Even in large reports and the newspaper, no restrictions have what Ivar Underberge can call.
What Ivar Underberge writes I will call partly harmless and utopian, that someone feels overwhelmed by his writings is actually what eg. Me and my family have experienced writings against us by the evil Trinity. It is the man with the fictitious name Ansgar Braut, Jan Aage Torp and Torodd Fuglesteg as little things to count. But these will never be punished by the police when they have immunity as it is an unwritten law that it is allowed to write all the shit one would against me and my family without being punished.

After reading what has been written online over the past half year and in various newspapers and otherwise. Then it was very sad that the case between me and the criminal Jan Aage Torp who went with his fictitious review of me when he hated me and my preaching about and against remarriage. That that case never came to the Norwegian Supreme Court, so that they could realize that the paragraphs and the contents of Norway's laws have not kept up with time, they are on many offsets.
Then hit the Ivar Underberge when it is actually the politicians, the lawyers and everyone who has responsibility that has not done their job, not Ivar Undergege.

They had a certain opportunity to take our case between me and Jan Aage Torp to the Norwegian Supreme Court, where one could ascertain that the regulations do not hold goals. Something that my lawyer Brynjar Meling pointed out already during the court proceedings in Oslo District Court, but was not taken into account either in the judgment or during the court proceedings. This became the major theme in Borgarting Lagmannsrett, but this was not mentioned in the judgment. When Brynjar Meling wrote his petition to the Norwegian Supreme Court, which was actually a "master's".
This was rejected in cash, in many ways the Norwegian judicial system appears to be a pamphlet where nothing really works. This is real discouraging, marvelous and makes Norway a democracy that is in a downward spiral staircase. Here should still have learned lessons, and begun with legal investigation, improvement and possibly let these issues as me either stand on hold. Or so that pr. Today we do not have a law that can judge anyone, therefore you are acquitted, so far.

Picture of my lawyer Brynjar Meling.

Attorney Brynjar Meling's claim to the Norwegian Supreme Court!


Advokatfirma Meling AS

A company in the law firm Sjødin, Meling & amp; Co.

St. Olavsgt. 13, PO Box 860 City Center, 4004 Stavanger - Tel: +45 51 84 20 60 - Fax: +47 51 84 20 61 - Mob 47 89 32 20/93 05 01 58


Stavanger May 11, 2017

Our ref: 22375

Their ref: 16-086576AST-BORG / 02

Responsible lawyer: Brynjar N. Meling

Borgarting court of law

Postbox 8017 Dep

0030 OSLO



Borgarting Court of Appeal on 27.04.2017 delivered judgment in case no. 16-086576AST-BORG / 02 with such unanimous ruling: «The appeal is rejected».

The judgment upheld Oslo District Court's judgment of 25.01.2016 in case no. 15-073540MED-OTIR / 02, where the verdict reads:

1. Jan Kåre Christensen, b. 03.08.1964 is sentenced for violation of the Penal Code of 1902 §390a to a fine of 12,000 - twelve thousand - NOK, or alternatively, imprisonment for 20 - twenty - days.

2. Jan Kåre Christensen is acquitted of the claim for redress.

3. Jan Kåre Christensen is further judged to pay public costs of 3,000 - three thousand - NOK.

The Court of Appeal's verdict has been preached to convicted persons 28.04.2017. The present appeal and supporting letter have been filed in due time. The appeal concerns the Court of Appeal's case processing and law enforcement. The appellant assumes that there are two issues that both matter outside the case in question.

The fact of the matter

The Court of Appeal has made the District Court's description of the fact its own by citing the three most central sections of the District Court's reproduction of fact on pages 3 and 4 of the Court of Appeal's judgment. As far as it goes, this description must therefore be used as a basis. § 306, second paragraph.

Case handling errors, provocation and retorting

As can be seen at the bottom of page 4 and at the top of page 5 of the Court of Appeal's judgment, the convicted person stated to his defense that his statements had to be punished or judged mildly based on the principle of provocation and retort.

The Court of Appeal - despite this statement - has not at all gone into the extent to which the abusive and meaningful offenders' objection to the verbal assault of the accusing party has been, or what kind of characteristics convicted had to endure as retaliation for their verbal attacks against Pastor Torp.

As meaningful assessment of any impunity or reduced punishment due to. provocation and rhetoric in relation to reciprocal verbal attacks presupposes both a quantitative and qualitative comparison of the expressed statements from both sides, it is stated that the Court of Appeal's decision grounds are insufficient.

The Court of Appeal - see the first complete paragraph on page 8 of the judgment - in the present context confined itself to stating that Torp's counter-attack against Christensen has helped to escalate and prolong the conflict between the convicted and the offender. This is not sufficient to dispel the possible significance of the "balance of speech", either for the question of guilt or punishment.

The aforementioned inadequacy of the Court of Appeal's premises is further related to the fact that the size (1902) § 250 is not mentioned at all in the court's premises, which in itself is also a further inadequacy, given the questions relating to the law court's legal understanding, see further below.

Case processing error, justified resentment

The majority of the characteristics by which the convicted person has spoken about the life-style of the offender reveal that Christensen has been moral - or moralizing if one wants - upset by certain aspects of Pastor Torp's way of life and behavior, conditions which appear to be purely objective. contrary to the word of the Bible.

Although literal belief and unified application of moral bids in religious, allegedly sacred texts is no longer a common phenomenon in Norwegian social reality, especially when it is not a matter of punishable acts in secular sense, and even of attacking others in such a way the full public basis is even more unusual than merely holding judgmental attitudes on religious grounds, one has to ask the question of it not - within the narrow circles where fundamentalist attitudes to such issues are still widespread and considered fully legitimate - may be the basis for considering Pastor Torp's way of life as the basis for "justified resentment", cf. strl. (1902) § 56 no. 1 (b)?

Can Christensen et al. Is it considered to have acted in justified resentment, given that the particular theological context both convicted and offended belongs?

The fact that the Court of Appeal in its terms at all does not discuss the issue is stated to imply that the decision grounds in the judgment are inadequate. This even though strl. (1901) Section 56 (1) (b) was not explicitly invoked by the defense forces: The Court of Appeal waits ex officio over the application of law.

Wrong use of law, size. (1902) § 390a

As the court in the second to last paragraph on page 6 of the judgment correctly states, the Norwegian Supreme Court has not dealt with matters relating to size. § 1902 § 390a (repeated in str l. (2005) § 266) in relation to blog posts or other publicly available material on the internet.

It is stated that the law of the Court of Appeal is incorrect, because via the Internet making utterances close is found to be abusive available to a wide and indefinite personal circle or may be regarded as a defamation of honor, not as "by troublesome behavior or other ruthless behavior having violated someone else's peace". Defamation of honor is at the entry into force of the Strl. (2005) - contrary to the continuation of previous section 390a - made a criminal offense. Proper use of law would have led to impunity for appellant parties, size no. (2005) § 3, cf. last paragraph on page 5 of the Court of Appeal's judgment.

Strl. (1902) § 390a and strl. (2005) § 266, according to its wording, protects the "peace" of the offended, not his sense of honor. Strl. (1902) § 246 struck the offender of "someone else's sense of honor" § 247 the one who injured "another's good name and reputation" or who uttered something that was appropriate "to postpone him for hatred, disrespect or loss of it for his position or nutrition required confidence ”. Both their own sense of honor and reputation in the eyes of others are - as the word clearly shows - something other than and essentially different from the "peace" of the offended.

By Grl. §§ 96, paragraph 1 cf. 113 and ECHR art. 7 follows a clarity requirement as regards the legal basis for punishment. The Court of Appeal's law-application bears - on the basis of a sense of punishment - the character of being a strongly expanding interpretation of size. (1902) § 390a. Ie An interpretation that is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and ECHR for penal provisions, nevertheless applied to be able to hit actions and utterances that were previously affected by size. (1902) Sections 246 and 247, after these have not been continued in the new Penal Code, and according to the provision in size. (2005) Section 3 shall also be punishable by judicial review of older conditions following a legislative amendment.

Furthermore, both Grl. § 100 and ECHR Art. 10 the principle of freedom of expression.

The abolition of the older penalties for defamation of honor must be seen in light of this: Also, utterances that are unpleasant, controversial, even offensive and hurtful should, as the great and general point of departure, be punishable. When the utterances are not addressed directly to the offender - it had been left to Pastor Torp to completely refrain from reading the blog of the accusing party - and not imposed on him in any way whatsoever, it is stated to be dual convention and unconstitutional. the statements in Christensen's blog for punishment without being protected by freedom of speech.

Firstly, it is stated to be contrary to the clarity requirement to interpret size. (1902) § 390a expanding the way the Court of Appeal does, and secondly, that the content of the statements Christensen has come with lies within what freedom of speech includes. In any case, § 390a cannot mean that utterances that might, but can no longer be punished as defamation, are instead punished as violating another's peace. Such a practice becomes, after the appellant's view, an erosion and a circumvention of a clear legislative decision.

HR-2016-1015-A is not relevant to the case against Christensen. In HR-2016-1015-A, this was a completely different type of criminal offense, in which the wording of the relevant provision also clearly aims to include a majority of conceivable modes, cf. blue. that the wording includes the effect of the offender via third person ("his closest"). Rt. 2010 p. 845 applies to actions clearly within size. § 390a, since it was (an exceptionally large amount) emails directly to the victim.

The other judicial references in the Court of Appeal's judgment do not eliminate the need for a clarifying assessment of the correct application of the law through a precedent ruling by the Norwegian Supreme Court.

Controversial statements about named persons, as well as life-style attacks and life-style, abound on the Internet. The fact that utterances addressed to the general public also come to the mentioned knowledge and can fall this heavily for the chest, must not become a detour to nevertheless be able to prosecute statements made by the legislature - wise or unwise - when adopting and implementing a new criminal code with a broad pen chose to decriminalize.

If some such statements can be punished again, according to our legal order, it is a legislature's task to adopt new legal provisions for this, while observing the requirements of the Constitution, the ECHR and possibly other relevant conventions. The fact that the prosecution and the courts lay the ground for others to strike something that - rightly or wrongly - finds punishable is precisely what Rt. 1952 page 989 - the telephony case - means that should not take place.

Termination is also pointed out that both size (1902) § 390a and size one. (2005) § 266 lacks connection to a provocation and retorting authority, such as in size one. (1902) in relation to sections 246 and 247, in the form of size. (1902) § 250. That violent opinions - both only two parties in between and in the public space, eg. internet - frequently occurs precisely in the form of utterance and contradiction, is a real consideration that shows how important it is that Such conditions as the controversy between Jan Kåre Christensen and Jan-Aage Torp are assessed according to balanced legislation that is intended to regulate precisely such conditions, and not to a legal authority that has a completely different history. And not least (at least originally) a completely different purpose.

Claim and processual

If the case is referred for consideration by the Norwegian Supreme Court and the court then the appellant party is right in their view of the law use as far as the scope of the rule is concerned. (1902) § 390a, incomplete grounds of judgment in relation to possible grounds for impunity have no longer relevance. It is therefore dismissed so reverently

P A S T A N D:

Principal: Jan Kåre Christensen is acquitted.

In the alternative: Borgarting Court of Appeal's judgment of 27.04.2017 in case no. 16-086576AST-BORG / 02 is repealed.

The case is considered by referral suitable as trial case, and the appellant party also wishes the undersigned defendant appointed as his defense (for trial) also for the Norwegian Supreme Court.

It is assumed sufficient to set aside a court day for the consideration of the case.

With regards


Brynjar N. Meling


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