It is quite obvious that my lawyer was right in his argument in court when he argued that it was absolutely wrong law enforcement used to me by the prosecution to get a verdict that is also wrong!
Picture of Jon Wessel-Aas who said, among other things. the following: "This principle law question of interpretation should ideally get its clarification in the Supreme Court, Wessel Aas believes." Unfortunately, the Supreme Court rejected this appeal, today they cannot really judge anyone for anything they write online as the laws are not adapted to the time we live in. day.
This writes the newspaper VG.
Minister of Justice Tor Mikkel Wara is working to stop people like the web server Ivar Underberge. Wara Looks at prison sentences for ecstasy.
Experts critical by the factuality issue: - The legislation is not up to date.
- Can you guarantee that something will be done to stop people like Ivar Underberge?
- I cannot guarantee how individual cases are treated. It is the police and the court that must deal with these. That said, we want to embark on this type of crime. These examples presented by VG are serious. It is not always the laws and the practice of the laws that depend on the technology, and then we have to do something, he says.
The judgment against me was a forgery, as it has no effect on anything. That was exactly what my lawyer Brynjar Meling pointed out. That shows today both with me and other issues on the web that he was right.
Jan Aage Torp who says the police did a good job. This is just "sausage weave", it was the judges from the Oslo District Court Malin Strømberg Amble and Øystein Hermansen from Borgarting Court of Appeal who "braided" into what I was convicted for when in court it came out that the charge did not hold water!
Here are lies, lies and once again everything is about in the case against me and the heavenly blog to get me doomed.
The police blindly trust Torp, which I do not do at all as he is a notorious liar and loves to fabricate stories. He believes that I am not sending out false letters in his name. Why didn't they ask me? Trust blindly at Torp I would not recommend anyone. Do not understand why he pulls me into this with false letters. Yes, I understand, he has me brains that all sinners have when they have got a sting in their hearts over what I have preached!
This must be the lie of the century!
1.) The blame is waterproof, when it is Torp and his allies who have written five times more than me in both verbal words and expressions.
As well as in quantity, it is written guaranteed five times more than what I have written.
2.) Proof of evidence in the trial was ala Congo and North Korea. Then Jan Aage Torp's claim is simply a lie.
Joh.e. 8. 44 You have the devil's father, and you will make your father's lusts; he was a murderer from the beginning and is not in the truth; for truth is not in him. When he speaks lies, he speaks of his own, for he is a liar and the father of lies.
3.) The law enforcement is also so, when everyone else says it is wrong to use law.
Torp writes: "First and foremost, the triple-judgment is a victory for our preacher-colleagues who are dogged daily and bullied by the blogger in question."
It is strange how Torp can both lie and fabricate as I have not called any publishers. Secondly, I do not write about publishers every day, but occasionally I pick up things that upbeat among publishers hate Torp obviously!
It looks like this, with the law enforcement that has been used against me and the Heavenly Blog, is what this case will be crucial, finally!
It will be exciting if we win with this argument. This writes my lawyer Brynjar Meling to the Norwegian Supreme Court:
Wrong use of law, size. (1902) § 390a
As the court in the second to last paragraph on page 6 of the judgment correctly states, the Norwegian Supreme Court has not dealt with matters relating to size. § 1902 § 390a (repeated in size (2005) § 266) in relation to blog posts or other publicly available material on the internet.
It is stated that the Court of Appeal's application of law is wrong, because via the Internet making statements the offender finds offensive available to a wide and indefinite personal circle may or may not be regarded as a defamation of honor, not as "by troublesome behavior or other ruthless behavior having violated another's peace" . Defamation of honor is at the entry into force of the Strl. (2005) - contrary to the continuation of previous section 390a - made a criminal offense. Proper use of law would have led to impunity for appellant parties, size no. (2005) § 3, cf. last paragraph on page 5 of the Court of Appeal's judgment.
Strl. (1902) § 390a and strl. (2005) § 266, according to its wording, protects the "peace" of the offended, not his sense of honor. Strl. (1902) § 246 struck the offender of "someone else's sense of honor" § 247 the one who injured "another's good name and reputation" or who uttered something that was appropriate "to postpone him for hatred, disrespect or loss of it for his position or nutrition required confidence ”. Both their own sense of honor and reputation in the eyes of others are - as wording n clear shows - other than and essentially different from the "peace" of the offended.
By Grl. §§ 96, paragraph 1 cf. 113 and ECHR art. 7 follows a clarity requirement as regards the legal basis for punishment. The Court of Appeal's law-application bears - on the basis of a sense of punishment - the character of being a strongly expanding interpretation of size. (1902) § 390a. Ie An interpretation that is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and ECHR for penal provisions, nevertheless applied to be able to hit actions and utterances that were previously affected by size. (1902) Sections 246 and 247, after these have not been continued in the new Penal Code, and according to the provision in size. (2005) Section 3 shall also be punishable by judicial review of older conditions following a legislative amendment.
Furthermore, both Grl. § 100 and ECHR Art. 10 the principle of freedom of expression. The annulment of the older penal provisions concerning defamation of honor must be seen in light of this: Also utterances that are unpleasant, controversial, even offensive and hurtful, as the great and general starting point, must be punishable. When the utterances are not addressed directly to the offender - it had been left to Pastor Torp to completely refrain from reading the blog of the accusing party - and not imposed on him in any way whatsoever, it is stated to be dual convention and unconstitutional. the statements in Christensen's blog for punishment without being protected by freedom of speech.
Firstly, it is stated to be contrary to the clarity requirement to interpret size. (1902) § 390a expanding to the extent that the Court of Appeal does, and secondly, that the content of the statements Christensen has come with lies within what freedom of speech includes. In any case, § 390a cannot mean that utterances that might, but can no longer be punished as defamation, are instead punished as violating another's peace. Such a practice becomes, after the appellant's view, an erosion and a circumvention of a clear legislative decision.
HR-2016-1015-A is not relevant to the case against Christensen. In HR-2016-1015-A, this was a completely different type of criminal offense, where the wording of the relevant provision also clearly aims to include a majority of conceivable modes, cf. blue. that the wording includes the influence of the offender via third person ("his closest"). Rt. 2010 p. 845 applies to actions clearly within size. § 390a, since it was (an exceptionally large amount) emails directly to the victim.
The other judicial references in the Court of Appeal's judgment do not eliminate the need for a clarifying assessment of the correct application of the law through a precedent ruling by the Norwegian Supreme Court.
Controversial statements about named persons, as well as life-style attacks and life-style, abound on the Internet. The fact that utterances addressed to the general public also come to the mentioned knowledge and can fall this heavily for the chest, must not become a detour to nevertheless be able to prosecute statements made by the legislature - wise or unwise - when adopting and implementing a new criminal code with a broad pen chose to decriminalize.
If some such statements can be punished again, according to our legal order, it is a legislature's task to adopt new legal provisions for this, while observing the requirements of the Constitution, the ECHR and possibly other relevant conventions. The fact that the prosecution and the courts lay the ground for others to strike something that - rightly or wrongly - finds punishable is precisely what Rt. 1952 page 989 - the telephony case - means that should not take place.
Termination is also pointed out that both size (1902) § 390a and size one. (2005) § 266 lacks connection to a provocation and retorting authority, such as in size one. (1902) in relation to sections 246 and 247, in the form of size. (1902) § 250. That violent opinions - both only two parties in between and in the public space, eg. the internet - frequently occurring precisely in the form of utterance and contradiction, is a real consideration which shows how important it is that such conditions as the dispute between Jan Kåre Christensen and Jan-Aage Torp are assessed according to balanced legal provisions intended to regulate precisely such conditions, and not for a legal authority that has a completely different history. And not least (at least originally) a completely different purpose.
The same thing, lawyer Jon Wessel Aas has said on several occasions. Here is some of what Wessel Aas has black journalists:
Media law attorney Jon Wessel-Aas reacts to violations of Clause 390a of the Criminal Code "because of troublesome behavior or other ruthless behavior having violated another's peace" is the basis of the case against Pastor Jan Kåre Christensen.
- I cannot comment on the details of the case, but I think in principle that it is especially that this paragraph is used, because this is talk of speeches in a blog. So, Christensen does not seek out Torp by phone, text message or in any other way directly, but writes what he believes about him as a pastor in the blog. It is outside the core area the relevant provision, says Wessel-Aas, who emphasizes that he only knows the case through circulation in Vårt Land and by reading the seal.
ve the indictment.
Wessel-Aas points out that the aforementioned provision in the penal code from the old has been called the "telephony law".
- It is clear that bullying and harassment in social media over time can make people not have the energy to be more. But I still think it is important that the court does not extend the penalty clause to too much. It is a point to be as concrete as possible when limiting freedom of expression through legislation, says Wessel-Aas.
Statements such as "living in adultery" make it more obvious to use the lien, the lawyer believes. Libel is decriminalized in the new Penal Code and can thus only form the basis for civil lawsuits. According to him, it seems more relevant in this case.
"I believe there is danger in the journey if the section in the Penal Code is expanded by adding something that is no longer criminal," says Wessel-Aas.
Public person. - What consequences can any judgment have?
- If there is a criminal conviction in line with the charge, I believe much else can be judged in the same way. It will make the boundaries of freedom of expression unclear, which in turn can cause people to avoid expressing themselves, Wessel-Aas replies and points out that there are nevertheless provisions to protect against untrue accusations, violations of privacy, threats and incitement to violence .
Wessel-Aas points out that Torp is a well-known figure in Christian-Norway and far in the same position as many politicians.
- The room must be larger when it comes to public opinion.
Christensen disagrees with how Torp practices the relationship between life and learning, ie his interpretation of biblical texts, emphasizes Wessel-Aas.
- Also, the ceiling height must be large.
Yes to the Supreme Court.
Freedom of the media and freedom of opinion expert, lawyer Jon Wessel-Aas believes that Christensen's statements are not punishable.
"The special thing in this case is that you use punishment for a criminal provision that in any case historically and in its core will hit the more direct violations of the peace," he says.
Wessel Aas believes it is more natural to consider whether the blog posts are defamatory?
He points out that the Storting has an intention that defamation should be a matter between the parties and therefore must be pursued through civil lawsuits with claims for compensation.
Such cases are no longer a matter for the police and prosecutors.
In principle, the Court of Appeal's view also implies that the press's general publications can be prosecuted according to the provision on peace violations.
He likes to see the Supreme Court take hold of the case.
- This principle question of law interpretation should ideally get its clarification in the Supreme Court, Wessel Aas believes.