torsdag 11. mai 2017

No 1547: Attorney Brynjar Meling's appeal to the Norwegian Supreme Court!

No 1547:
Attorney Brynjar Meling's appeal to the Norwegian Supreme Court!

Anke has now been delivered to Norway's Supreme Court.
You have prayed, have probably never been asked for as much as lately.
Now I am fully sure that God has responded to all the prayers.
Now you can thank, either, the prayer bowls give us victory, yes, more victory.
Wondering more?


Go down on your knees and thank and pray for the protection of Jesus' blood and that the angels and the Spirit of God will protect and lead us all into finished works!

Strugel is between me and fool Apostel Jan Aage Torp, photo.



STAVANGER OSLO MOUNTAIN
Advokatfirma Meling AS
A company in the law association Sjødin, Meling & Co.
St. Olavsgt. 13, PO Box 860, 4004 Stavanger - Tel: 51 84 20 60 - Fax: 51 84 20 61 - Mob 47 89 32 20/93 05 01 58
www.smco.no
.
Stavanger May 11, 2017
Our ref: 22375
Your ref: 16-086576AST-BORG / 02
Responsible lawyer: Brynjar N. Meling
Borgarting Court of Appeal
PO Box 8017 Dep
0030 OSLO
APPLICATION AND SUPPORT FOR THE HIGHWAY OF NORWAY IN THE COURT'S CASE NO. 16-086576AST-BORG / 02
Introduction
Borgarting Court of Appeals ruled on 27.04.2017 judgment in Case No. 16-086576AST-BORG / 02 with such unanimous verdict: 'The appeal is rejected'.
The verdict confirms the judgment of Oslo District Court of 25.01.2016 in case no. 15-073540MED-OTIR / 02, in which the ruling reads:
1. Jan Kåre Christensen, born on 03.08.1964, is convicted of violation of the Penal Code of 1902 §390 a to a fine of 12,000 - twelve thousand kroner, or alternatively imprisonment for twenty-twentieth days.
2. Jan Kåre Christensen is fired for the expulsion claim.
3. Jan Kåre Christensen is further ordered to pay costs to the public by 3,000 - three thousand kroner.
The Court of Appeal's judgment is pronounced for convicted 28 .04.2017. This appeal and support letter is submitted in due time. The appeal applies to the Appeals Court's case-law and law enforcement. Appealing party assumes that there are two questions that both matter outside the current case.
Fact of the case
The District Court has made the district court's description of fact to its own by citing the three most important sections of the District Court's reproduction of the fact on pages 3 and 4 of the Court of Appeal's judgment. As far as it goes, this description must therefore be taken into account, str.prl. § 306, second paragraph.
Case handling error, provocation and retribution
As it appears at the bottom of page 4 and at the top of page 5 of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the defendant stated in his defense that his judgments had to be subjected to a penalty sentence or to be judged mildly from the principle of provocation and retribution.
In spite of this statement, the Court of Appeal has, in any case, ignored the extent to which abusive and alleged opposition by the accused's verbal assault has been or what characteristics of the convicted person have had to endure in return for his verbal assault against Pastor Torp.
As meaningful assessment of possible impunity or reduced punishment due to Provocation and rhetoric in relation to reciprocal verbal attacks presupposes both a quantitative and qualitative comparison of the arguments put forward from both sides, it is stated that the decision of the Court of Appeal is insufficient.
The Court of First Instance has - see first full section on page 8 of the judgment - in the present context limited to finding that Torp's counterattack against Christensen has helped escalate and prolong the conflict between convicted and insulted. This is insufficient in order to eliminate the meaning of the "balance of payments", either for the sake of guilt or punishment.
The above-mentioned inadequacy of the Court of First Instance's premises is further related to Strl. (1902) § 250 is not mentioned at all in the court's premises, which in itself is also an additional inadequacy given the questions relating to the law of the court of law, see below.
Litigation, legitimate resentment
From the majority of the characters through whom the convicted person has expressed the conduct of insults, it appears that Christensen has been moral - or moralizing if you want - upset over certain aspects of pastor Torp's way of life and behavior, things that purely objectively appear to be in Contrary to the word of the Bible.
Although literal and unconventional use of moral bans in religious allegedly sacred texts is no longer a common phenomenon in Norwegian social reality, especially when it is not a criminal offense in the secular sense, and even to attack others in such a way Publicly available basis is even more unusual than simply holding condemnations on religious grounds, one must ask it about it - within the narrow circles where fundamentalist attitudes to such issues are still widespread and considered fully legitimate - May be the basis for considering Pastor Torp's conduct as a basis for "legitimate misery", cf. strl. (1902) Section 56, No. 1, point b)?
Can Christensen be considered to have acted in justified anger, given that the special theological con text is both convicted and insulted?
The fact that the Court of Appeal in its premises does not discuss the issue at all, is alleged to mean that the ruling grounds in the judgment are insufficient. This even though strl. (1901) Section 56, No. 1, point b), was not explicitly invoked by the defense: The Court of Appeal is ex officio abiding by the law enforcement.
Wrong law enforcement, Strl. (1902) § 390a
As the court in the last paragraph on page 6 of the verdict correctly states, the Norwegian Supreme Court has not dealt with matters relating to strl. Section 1902 Section 390a (Repeated in section (2005) § 266) in relation to blog posts or other, widely available material on the internet.
It is stated that the law of law of the court of law is incorrect because, through the internet, making an omnipotence finds offensive accessible to a widespread and indefinite personal circle may be regarded as an offense of honor, not as "by unpleasant behavior or other reckless conduct having violated another's peace". Honorary violations are at the commencement of Strl. (2005) - contrary to the continuation of former section 390a - made penalty strain. Correct law enforcement would have resulted in impunity for the accused party, Strl. (2005) § 3, cf. Last section on page 5 of the Court of Appeal's judgment.
Strl. (1902) § 390a and strl. (2005) Section 266 intends, in its wording, to protect the "peace" of offenders, not his sense of honor. Strl. (1902) Section 246 struck the one who violated "another's sense of honor" section 247 the one who injured "another's good name and reputation" or expressed something that was appropriate "to expose him to hate, wrongdoing or loss of it for his position Or nutrition needed trust ". Both their own sense of honor and reputation in the eyes of others is, as the wording clearly shows, something different from being different from the "peace" of insults.
By Grl. §§ 96, first paragraph cf. 113 and EMK art. 7 follows a clarification requirement as regards the legal basis for punishment. The law of law of the Court of Appeal is based on a sense of punishment - characterized by being a strongly expanding interpretation of strl. (1902) § 390a. Ie A constitutional interpretation of the Criminal Code and the ECHR, used to be able to affect actions and issues previously affected by strl. (1902) Sections 246 and 247, after these were not continued in the new Penal Code, and according to the provision in section. (2005) Section 3 shall be subjected to penalties by the conviction of elderly relationships after the amendment.
Furthermore, both Grl. § 100 and EMC art. 10 principle of freedom of expression.
The abolition of the earlier penalties for erasion crimes must be seen in light of this: Also, expressions that are unacceptable, controversial, even offensive and hurtful shall, as the general and general starting point, be punishment. When the statements were not directed directly to the insulted - it was true that Pastor Torp had completely failed to read the blog of an obsessive party - and was not forced to him personally in any way, claiming to be double constitutional and constitutional to consider The expressions in Christensen's blog for criminal offenses without being protected by freedom of expression.
Thus, it is stated firstly that it is contrary to the clarity requirement to interpret strl. (1902) § 390a as the Court of Appeal does, and secondly, that the content of the comments Christensen has included lies within the scope of freedom of expression. Section 390a, however, may not mean that any perjury that may, but no longer be punishable as defamation, may be punished as an offense of another's peace. Such an approach becomes an utterance and a perpetuation of a clear legislative act, according to the appellant's view.
HR-2016-1015-A is not relevant to the case against Christensen. In HR-2016-1015-A, it was a completely different type of punishable relationship, where the wording of the provision in question also clearly aims to cover a majority of conceivable modes, cf. blue. That the wording includes the effect of offended by third party ("his closest"). Rt. 2010 p. 845 applies to actions clearly within strl. § 390a, because it was (an exceptionally large amount) e-mailed direct to insulted.
The other judgment references in the Court of Appeal's judgment do not eliminate the need for a clear assessment of the correct application of justice through a precedent case by the Norwegian Supreme Court.
Controversial expressions about named people, as well as attack on life as a way of life, abound on the internet. The fact that expressions directed to the general public are also referred to as knowledge and may fall too heavily for the breast. Do not be circumvented to still be able to prosecute judgments - wisely or unwise - by adopting and enforcing a new penal code with a broad pen chosen to decriminalize.
Should such extravagances be re-punished, according to our legal order, a statutory commission may, if necessary, adopt new provisions for this, in compliance with the requirements of the Constitution, the ECHR and any other relevant conventions. That prosecutors and courts make other arrangements in order to strike something that - rightly or wrongly - finds punishable, is exactly what Rt. 1952 Page 989 - The Phone Challenge - does not mean to take place.
Finally, it is pointed out that as much as (1902) § 390a as Strl. (2005) § 266 is lacking in connection with a provocation and retribution, as in strl. (1902) in relation to sections 246 and 247, in the form of strl. (1902) § 250. Tough expressions of opinion - only two parties in between as in the public space, eg. The internet - often occurring in the form of expression and opposition, is a real consideration that shows how important it is that such conditions as the battle between Jan Kåre Christensen and Jan-Aage Torp are assessed according to balanced legislation intended to regulate precisely such conditions, and Not for a legal basis that has a completely different history. And not least (at least originally) a completely different purpose.
Claim and Processual
If the case is referred to the Norwegian Supreme Court and the court then the accused party is entitled in its view of the law enforcement as far as the scope of strl is concerned. (1902) § 390a, has incomplete judgment grounds in relation to possible grounds of impunity, no longer relevant. It is therefore closed so reverently
P ON STAND:
Principal: Jan Kåre Christensen is fired.
In the alternative, the judgment of 27 April 2017 in Borgarting Court of Appeal of Case No 16-086576ST-BORG / 02 is hereby repealed.
The case is considered by reference suitable for trial, and the appellant also wishes the undersigned defender appointed as his defendant (for trial) also for the Norwegian Supreme Court.
It is thought to be sufficient to set a trial for consideration of the case.
With regards
THE CERTIFICATE OF ASSOCIATION SJØDIN, MELING & CO
Brynjar N. Meling
Lawyer

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